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MAINTAINING MARGINS: 
THE POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELDWORK 
IN CHINESE CENTRAL ASIA 
Joanne N. Smith 
Introduction 
In contemporary China, conditions for doing fieldwork are increasingly 
dependent on locality. The sensitive border region of Xinjiang, historically 
dominated by minority nationalities resistant to incorporation within the Chinese 
polity, has long been difficult.1 Researchers gained unprecedented access to the 
region following the re-emergence of the social sciences as officially sanctioned 
disciplines in China in 1979. Yet that access has been under continual threat. The 
pro-democracy campaign and the Tiananmen incident of 1989, the collapse of 
Marxist-Leninist parties in Eastern Europe in 1989, the Baren uprising of April 
1990 in south Xinjiang and the collapse of the USSR and formation of 
independent Central Asian states in 1991 fueled a growing desire for 
independence among Xinjiang's majority Uyghur nationality.2 Uyghur-Han 
tensions climaxed in the Ghulja [Ch. Yining] riots of 5-6 February 1997, leading 
My thanks to Cristina Ces?ro and to the two anonymous referees of The China Journal for 
their comments on the first draft. Fieldwork in 1995-96 was funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council, UK. 
Three independent states were established in response to growing Chinese influence in the 
region from the 1800s: the Q?shq?r [Kashgar] Emirate of Yaqub Beg (1864-77), the 
Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan (1933-34) and the Eastern Turkestan 
Republic (1944^19). Recently, the proportion of Han Chinese in Xinjiang has increased 
owing to Han in-migration, see David Wang, "The Uyghurs and Disparity in Xinjiang's 
Social Demography", paper given at the conference Situating the Uyghurs between China 
and Central Asia, School of Oriental and African Studies, 5-6 November 2004. 
The 1989 pro-democracy movement had a national impact; following its suppression, 
officials pointed to the influence of "bourgeois" social sciences on the student movement, 
arguing that social research identified negative social trends, fueling calls for reform, see 
Daniel J. Curran and Sandra Cook, "Doing Research in Post-Tiananmen China", in Claire 
Renzetti and Raymond Lee (eds), Researching Sensitive Topics (London: Sage, 1993), p. 72. 
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to a sharp intensification of the "Strike Hard" anti-separatist campaign.3 
Subsequently, the events of 11 September 2001 and the "war against terror" have 
in the view of some observers provided the state with a means of repackaging 
disaffected Uyghurs as "Islamic terrorists". Under these steadily worsening 
conditions, field research in the region has come under intense state scrutiny.4 
State politics, moreover, are only one facet of the difficulties faced by 
researchers in the social sciences in Chinese Central Asia. The interpersonal 
politics of gender, culture, religion and values intertwine with state politics 
during the negotiation of research roles. This paper examines the intersection of 
state and interpersonal politics during fieldwork through the lens of shifting 
margins: the margins of the state, gender margins, intercultural and religious 
margins. It draws on a total of fifteen months' research conducted between 1995 
and 2004. After a brief discussion of the difficulties of survey research and 
secondary sources, I focus on the more informal methods I chose to rely on to 
collect my data. 
Domestic Politics and Data Collection 
In Xinjiang, official documents, scholarly sources, statistical information and 
media reports must be treated with caution. Since 1949, state censorship has 
meant that much published literature is little more than a vehicle for promoting 
CCP policy. As one Chinese scholar put it: "The publishing houses in China are 
in fact governmental ministries ... Basically the conditions are that you can't 
oppose the Communist Party ... 
"5 An unusually high degree of censorship and 
self-censorship pervades official and academic publications in 
Xinjiang, where Chinese officials and scholars are extremely reluctant to discuss 
politically sensitive topics such as conflict between ethnic groups.6 
This is especially true in the field of history, where China's scholars have 
generally been obliged to mold their interpretations according to the interests of 
the Communist state. In Xinjiang, the problem is exaggerated since the state must 
3 On the Ghulja riots, see Ming pao, Hong Kong, 10 February 1997 in BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts (Asia Pacific), hereafter SWB (AP), 11 February 1997, FE/2840 G/l; 
Ming pao, 11 February 1997 in SWB (AP), 12 February 1997, FE/2841 G/l; Sing tao jih 
pao, Hong Kong, 11 February 1997 in SWB (AP), 12 February 1997, FE/2841 G/l; Sing tao 
jih pao, 15 March 1997 in SWB (AP), 18 March 1997, FE/2870 G/6; Kyodo News Service, 
Tokyo, 2 May 1997 in SWB (AP), FE/2909 G/7; "China's troubled frontiers", The 
Guardian, 11 February 1997. 
4 Several scholars had visa applications denied in 2004, though grounds for denial remain 
unclear (personal communications). 
5 Daniel J. Curran and Sandra Cook, "Doing Research in Post-Tiananmen China", p. 77. 
6 Cf. Nicholas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties", The China Journal, No. 44 (2000), p. 
67; Herbert Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: A Survey of Uygur-Han Relations in 
Urumqi", Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 36 (August 2003), p. 432. 
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represent history so as to legitimize its colonial presence.7 The dangers of 
drawing predominantly from official and scholarly Chinese accounts can be seen 
in Michael Dillon's recent book. Dillon relies heavily on translated extracts from 
Xu Yuqi's History of the Struggle against Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang. While 
undeniably rich, these extracts present a "handful of separatists" as caring little 
about their people while Chinese security forces are presented in an artificially 
positive light. Dillon neither problematizes these passages nor compares the 
perspectives of Chinese officials with those of Uyghur actors. The lack of 
engagement seems to result from the author's wish to approach the Xinjiang 
question with balance and objectivity, a task he admits is not easy given the 
"extreme partisanship of the protagonists".8 
In China, officially released statistics are often incomplete, and the 
researcher must question whether data has been politically generated or edited.9 
The risk of such distortion is high in Xinjiang, where the state places paramount 
importance on social and political stability. Figures on social and economic 
phenomena are always given for the population as a whole, making it impossible 
to compare circumstances across ethnic groups. 
10 
Statistics which provide 
information on locally controversial subjects such as population composition may 
be especially suspect. Population figures for Xinjiang record roughly the same 
ratio (37-41 per cent) of Han Chinese compared with minority groups in 1970, 
1990, 1996, 2000 and again in 2003, despite local anecdotal evidence pointing to 
accelerated levels of Han immigration.11 There are also discrepancies between 
data sources. The 2000 census revealed that the population in Xinjiang grew by 
nearly one third (twice the growth rate of the ethnic population) between 1990 
and 2000 to stand at 40.6 per cent of the regional total. Yet the Statistical 
Yearbook put this figure at only 38.7 per cent.12 While the Xinjiang Statistical 
Yearbook may be the best resource currently available, statistical data arguably 
7 See Gardner Bovingdon on the "historians serving the cause of Chinese nationalism", "The 
History of the History of Xinjiang", Twentieth-Century China, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2001), pp. 
95-139. 
8 
Uyghur ?migr? sources may be equally plagued by bias: "Documentary sources from both 
the official Chinese press and opponents of Chinese control ... have clearly defined and 
opposing political agendas ... ", Michael Dillon, Xinjiang?China's Muslim Far Northwest 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. ix. 
9 Daniel J. Curran and Sandra Cook, "Doing Research in Post-Tiananmen China", p. 71. 
10 Similar observations are made by Laura Newby, "'The Pure and True Religion' in China", 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10 (1988), p. 938; and Herbert Yee, "Ethnic Consciousness and 
Identity: A Research Report on Uygur-Han Relations in Xinjiang", Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 6, 
No. 1 (2005), p. 45. 
11 See Michael Dillon, "Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism and Control in Chinese Central Asia", 
Durham University East Asian Papers No. 1 (1995), pp. 31, 48; David Wang, "The Uyghurs 
and Disparity in Xinjiang's Social Demography". 
12 
Nicholas Becquelin, "Staged Development in Xinjiang", China Quarterly, Vol. 178 (2004), 
p. 369. 
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remain an instrument of propaganda in Xinjiang in cases where the political 
sensitivities of population issues have a direct impact on state security.13 
The Chinese media has historically hidden or distorted facts to meet political 
requirements. While this situation may be changing elsewhere in China, in 
Xinjiang, where authorities are anxious to promote an image of prosperity, 
stability and equality among ethnic groups, regional media continue to avoid 
reporting negative social and economic trends for fear of encouraging ethnic 
separatism.14 Instances of civil unrest are often reported late, and in some cases 
are not reported at all. A prominent example in 1996 was the assassination of a 
local Uyghur official and three of his relatives by separatists in Kucha. This 
incident was barely reported in the domestic press, though it loomed large in the 
classified Document No. 7,15 which contained recommendations that Han Chinese 
be moved into the region to stabilize unrest, that the Qorla-Q?shq?r railway be 
completed within three years to facilitate this, and that the political background 
of Uyghurs wishing to study abroad be scrutinized.16 Through the media, official 
discourse also distorts the scale of events. During the mid-nineties, when it was 
state strategy to contain separatists, unrest was played down. Against the 
background of the "war on terror", these same events have instead been played 
up and the separatists labeled "Islamic terrorists" in order to justify the state's 
crackdown. 
Western journalistic sources may also distort the picture, firstly through 
selective reporting of events, and secondly by playing up certain aspects. As 
Bovingdon has observed: "In reporting on politics in Xinjiang, Western media err 
in the direction of either sensationalist accounts of episodic violence or 
depictions of the surface calm and economic vibrancy of the region". 
17 
13 
Stanley Toops, while stating that recent censuses accord with international standards of 
demography, acknowledges these sensitivities, and notes that figures do not account for 
military personnel; also that they tally only officially registered migrants, whereas after 1964 
most Han migrants went to Xinjiang illegally: "The government either looked the other way 
or channelled and facilitated a movement of people ... whose presence in Xinjiang ... 
promoted the policies of the Chinese Communist Party and the state" ("The Demography of 
Xinjiang", in S. Frederick Starr [ed.],Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland [Armonk: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2004], pp. 241-42, 257-58). 
14 A discerning researcher can occasionally identify unusually candid news reports on regional 
problems such as the extent and detrimental effects of Han in-migration. See for instance 
Nicholas Becquelin, "Staged Development in Xinjiang", pp. 365, 369. 
15 
"Document No. 7" is the official record of a March 1996 meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the CCP's Politburo when the Xinjiang question was discussed. 
16 
Xinjiang ribao (Xinjiang Daily), ?r?mchi, 19 May 1996, in SWB (AP), 7 June 1996, 
FE/2632 G/l2, hints at "disturbances" in Kucha around this time. For reports later published 
outside China, see Nicola Beckley, "China's Muslims Sharpen Their Knives against Peking", 
The Independent, 5 March 1997, and Sing tao jih pao, 5 March 1997, in SWB (AP), 6 
March 1997, FE/2860G/3. 
17 Gardner Bovingdon, "The Not-so-silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in 
Xinjiang", Modern China, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2002), p. 42. 
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Nonetheless, valuable information can be obtained from both Chinese and 
Western media sources if one is prepared to read between the lines. 
Formal Survey 
Sociological analyses have traditionally been regarded by the Chinese socialist 
leadership as potential trouble. Prior to 1979, state control over formal surveys 
and interviews was intense;18 since 1979, while many restrictions have been lifted, 
state control intensifies at times of domestic unrest.19 Accordingly, though formal 
survey and interview may be viable methods when researching non-sensitive 
topics, they may not be the best means to study politically sensitive ones; this is 
all the more true where research focuses on borderland minority identities or on 
conflict between minority groups and the Han. Rudelson, working on identity in 
Xinjiang's eastern oasis of Turpan in 1989-90, reported the "political difficulty 
of conducting systematic interviewing", and adopted an ad hoc method of street 
interviewing.20 Since the mid-nineties, I have found that formal interviewing 
remains an unrealistic option when investigating sensitive identity issues. 
Following my arrival in the regional capital, ?r?mchi, in 1995, cadres at the 
Xinjiang Social Sciences Academy (Xinjiang Shehui Kexue Yuan) agreed that I 
might conduct a formal survey; yet it soon became clear that interviews would be 
supervised and would thus have little validity. Respondents would probably be 
briefed on what to say, and would almost certainly be afraid to answer honestly 
in front of Academy cadres. As Thogersen notes, power imbalances can 
sometimes render the official interview meaningless in China. Even where 
respondents are forthcoming, they will often give the interviewer a "nice rounded 
picture of reality as it ought to be" rather than providing real insights.21 Worse, 
18 In the mid-70s, only three English-speaking sociologists were working in China, see Daniel 
J. Curran and Sandra Cook, "Doing Research in Post-Tiananmen China", p. 71; see also 
Wong Siu-lun, "Social Enquiries in the People's Republic of China", Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 
3 (1975), pp. 459-76. 
19 
Following the Tiananmen incident, classified Document No. 598 barred Chinese academic 
institutions from collaboration with foreign scholars, see Daniel J. Curran and Sandra Cook, 
"Doing Research in Post-Tiananmen China", pp. 75-76. 
20 Justin Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uighur Nationalism along China's Silk Road (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 11. He does not say whether these difficulties resulted 
from restrictions introduced after 4 June 1989, but does describe how, in March 1990 and 
following the collapse of Eastern Europe, he was told that his research had "gone beyond 
permitted bounds", p. 15. 
21 
Stig Thogersen, "Official Interviewing in China: Notes from Four Trips", in Ole Bruun, 
Soren Poulsen and Hatla Thelle (eds), Modern China Research: Danish Experiences, 
Copenhagen Discussion Papers (Special Issue), University of Copenhagen (1991), pp. 31, 
42. Thomas B. Gold also notes respondent evasiveness in supervised interviews with getihu 
(urban private entrepreneurs, a stigmatized group at the time), "Guerrilla Interviewing 
among the Getihu", in Perry Link, Richard Madsen and Paul G. Pickowicz (eds), Unofficial 
China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1989), p. 180. 
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where surveys present politically unacceptable conclusions, their circulation may 
be restricted.22 
Herbert Yee's study on Uyghur-Han relations, conducted in 2001, provides 
another example. His team came under constant pressure from local officials "not 
to conduct fieldwork on sensitive issues such as ethnic relations and conflicts"; 
questions used in an earlier pilot study (2000) and designed to probe inter-group 
prejudices were dropped by local officials;23 others were "so thoroughly revised 
that they look more like propaganda slogans"; 40 per cent of those contacted 
declined to be interviewed; those who were interviewed "tended to give 
politically correct answers"; and the authorities held on to 200 questionnaires 
completed in Qumul [Ch. Hami]. Consequently, the author is forced to warn that 
the findings "may be seriously biased and must be read with great caution".24 
My Project 
Generally speaking, when investigating sensitive issues surrounding identity and 
ethnic relations in Xinjiang, I found the most viable method of enquiry to be 
unstructured interview (in the shape of informal conversation), combined with 
direct observation and followed up by semi-structured interview.25 My research 
questions in 1995-96 were: How far have regional and social group identities 
among the Uyghur been eclipsed by a Uyghur national (separatist) identity since 
independence of the Central Asian states in 1991? What is the nature of 
contemporary Uyghur-Han relations? On subsequent trips in 2002 and 2004, 
research questions focused on polarization of accommodating and resisting 
Uyghurs in the post-1997 period. Thus, I wanted to know: Which factors are now 
leading some Uyghurs to accommodate politically or culturally to Chinese 
hegemony? And which are causing others to turn away from the state and back to 
Islam?26 Apart from the question of accommodation, the issues were highly 
sensitive: the first two because they investigated aspirations to independence and 
Uyghur-Han conflict, thus denying the official line of "nationality unity"; the 
fourth because it touched upon the potential link between Islam and politics in a 
region where the state has outlawed so-called "illegal religious activities" since 
the mid-nineties. In each case, I selected key informants strategically to yield 
22 A social report entitled "The Communist Party and Socialism: Do People Believe in It?", 
conducted at Beijing University in 1990, discovered that a sizeable number did not believe, 
and subsequently it was not made publicly available, see Daniel J. Curran and Sandra Cook, 
"Doing Research in Post-Tiananmen China", pp. 77. 
23 I would suggest that, in allowing the initial survey, authorities were testing the water, and 
also that they did not expect the findings of a pilot study to be published, though they 
subsequently were, see Herbert Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang", pp. 431-52. 
24 Herbert Yee, "Ethnic Consciousness and Identity", pp. 35-6, 43, 50. 
25 See also Gold's description of "guerrilla interviewing". 
26 
Findings from both studies will be published in my monograph, Between Purity and 
Hybridity: Negotiating Uyghur Identities of Contemporary Xinjiang (work-in-progress). 
MAINTAINING MARGINS 137 
views indicative of different social, age and gender groups.27 This approach 
allowed for an initial patterning of identity ascriptions. In terms of my 1995-96 
aims, the comparison across generations was important in order to determine 
whether the sense of a national Uyghur identity had strengthened over time. 
Choice of additional informants and content of subsequent conversations was 
steered by information already gathered in a process of "progressive 
restructuring".28 In this way, I built up the number of key informants within each 
group while introducing partial structure to subsequent interviews in order to 
probe emerging themes. 
Gaining Access 
For the first 12-month study in 1995-96, a letter of introduction to a named cadre 
and a fee of ?5,000 gained me a research visa (code F) and affiliation to the 
Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, located in north-west ?r?mchi.29 Once 
there, however, I encountered many problems of access. The district was 
dominated by ethnic Han, while Uyghurs lived mostly in the south-east; and my 
hosts desired that I conduct all research on campus. My purchase of a bicycle was 
greeted with dismay, I was urged to adhere to a 10 p.m. curfew, and my request 
to have a telephone installed was denied "due to lack of funds". Thus, the cadres 
in Waiban (Waishi bangongshi?office dealing with foreign nationals and 
organizations) seemed bent on keeping my research indoors and firmly away 
from ?r?mchi's Uyghurs. The problem was later eased by a pager, though my 
activities continued to be closely watched.30 While respondents can these days be 
contacted via mobile phone or email, access to sites such as Yahoo and Hotmail 
can be painfully slow owing to installed filtering software, and it should be 
remembered that monitoring and censorship of electronic mail is routine.31 
27 Marc-Ad?lard Tremblay, "The Key Informant Technique: A Non-Ethnographic 
Application", in Robert G. Burgess (ed.), Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 98-99. 
28 Marc-Ad?lard Tremblay, "The Key Informant Technique", p. 99. 
29 On gaining official research access in contemporary China, see Mary Scoggin, "Gaining 
Entr?e: 101 Ways to Knock on your Subject's Door", China Exchange News, Vol. 22, No. 3 
(1994), pp. 22-25. 
30 Gardner Bovingdon, affiliated to Xinjiang University for 22 months during the mid-nineties, 
similarly described the experience as "like living in a fish-tank" (personal communication). 
A Chinese scholar, writing in 1989, noted: "In the Chinese academic world, library research 
has been traditionally the only form of research, and even today when someone speaks of 
empirical research, many people think of a busybody with a clipboard ... ", W. Li, "The 
Sociology of Law in China: Overview and Trends", Law and Society Review, No. 23, 
(1989), p. 907, cited in Daniel J. Curran and Sandra Cook, "Doing Research in Post 
Tiananmen China", p. 75. 
31 
Amnesty International, "People's Republic of China: State Control of the Internet in China", 
Report ASA 17/007/2002, pp. 9-11; for academic treatments of internet censorship, see Jack 
Linchuan Qiu, "Virtual Censorship in China: Keeping the Gate between the Cyberspaces", 
International Journal of Communications Law and Policy, Vol. 4 (1999/2000), pp. 1-25; 
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Still more problematic was my decision to interview Uyghurs in the south. It 
is true that, despite being dominated by Han Chinese, ?r?mchi is the best place 
to find a cross-section of Uyghurs from different oases and from urban and rural 
(migrant worker) backgrounds, and thus is a good base if forced to choose a 
single research location. That said, a trip to the south would enrich the range of 
perspectives studied by including peasants' views. But as the time to leave 
approached, Academy colleagues informed me that "due to recent events" (the 
Kucha assassinations of May 1996), I could not go there as a researcher. 
Fortunately, I managed to negotiate a trip as a tourist, provided that I phone in to 
the Academy once a week. Here, gender and age worked in my favor; as 
Easterday et al. observe, young female researchers are less likely to be 
considered a threat than are male or senior female researchers in otherwise 
difficult or inaccessible research settings.32 The attitude of Waiban staff had been 
consistently relaxed toward me, while manifesting some degree of suspicion 
toward a young male researcher based at the Academy. 
Negotiating Research Roles 
According to Raymond L. Gold's typology, four "master roles" are available to 
the participant observer: complete participant (covert research); participant-as 
observer (both researcher and respondents know that their relationship stems 
from the research); observer-as-participant (the observer role is made public, but 
relationships established with respondents are brief); and complete observer (the 
researcher is entirely removed from interaction with respondents).33 During the 
first trip, it became clear that different roles needed to be adopted when dealing 
with different people. I alternated between the roles of complete observer, 
participant-as-observer and complete participant. Sometimes I revealed my 
research status, while at other times remaining covert. Well-educated Uyghurs 
often had some knowledge of sociological research methods and were more 
confident in volunteering views and helping me to gather information and make 
contacts. With other social groups, I often found it necessary to play down or 
conceal my identity. Initial attempts to take notes in front of respondents 
provoked negative reactions ranging from anxiety to suspicion and mild anger. 
Once, when jotting down points from an earlier conversation held with a 
respondent, I was greeted by her angry face and the mock-polite enquiry: 
"Haven't you finished yet?" The act had clearly made her feel like a zoo animal. 
Eric Harwit and Duncan Clark, "Shaping the Internet in China: Evolution of Political 
Control over Network Infrastructure and Content", Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2001), pp. 
377-408; and Lokman Tsui, "The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom: 
Control and Regulation of the Internet in China", China Information, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2003), 
pp. 65-82. 
32 Lois Easterday, Diana Papademas, Laura Schorr and Catherine Valentine, "The Making of a 
Female Researcher: Role Problems in Fieldwork", in Robert. G. Burgess (ed.), Field 
Research, p. 66. 
33 Robert G. Burgess, "Some Role Problems in Field Research", in Robert G. Burgess (ed.), 
Field Research, pp. 45. 
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Uyghur peasants felt especially threatened by notebooks and diaries and I learned 
not to use them openly. 
The fact that some information was gathered and recorded without 
respondents' knowledge, and possibly without informed consent, raises the 
question of whether data collection was ethical. The covert approach may be 
justified when researching certain groups (for example, religious and sectarian 
groups) which might otherwise be inaccessible to study. In some fields, secret 
study may also be less disruptive, since it allows groups to be studied in their 
natural setting without being influenced by the researcher's presence.34 The 
ethical question is difficult in the context of doing sensitive research in repressive 
states like China, since if one acted according to the code of ethics recommended 
by sociologists in developed, democratic countries one would fail to obtain any 
data at all. Informal (and sometimes covert) interviews are often the only way of 
gaining knowledge in a politically charged environment such as Xinjiang, where 
respondents are wary of the Chinese authorities, Han neighbors and even Uyghur 
compatriots, not to mention researchers and journalists. While I normally 
informed educated respondents of my research goals, to reduce anxiety and 
secure more information I sometimes did not reveal my researcher status to the 
less educated. I protected respondent identities by allotting each respondent a 
code, and altering personal details that might lead to identification. I decided that 
it was justifiable, in the interests of production of knowledge, to give respondents 
false assurances, provided that information had been offered willingly and 
identities were fully protected in case of confiscation of data. 
Individuals who indicated that they were unwilling to disclose information 
were left alone. In 2002 I visited the home of a Uyghur singer famed for 
nationalist metaphor and allegory. I was initially served tea and snacks and 
shown music videos by relatives, who happily chatted about the singer's career in 
general. However, when I began to ask sensitive questions concerning the 
political messages in his songs, my tea-bowl was gradually removed further away 
from me and no longer refilled?an unmistakeable sign that I was no longer 
welcome. Though the questions had themselves been veiled, there was a definite 
line beyond which the family was not prepared to go, and out of respect for this I 
thanked them and took leave. 
Asking Questions 
Informal conversations did not entirely lack structure. I always had a basic 
framework of questions and issues in mind. Yet conversations also had to 
proceed naturally, since "it may be very threatening to hosts if one pumps them 
constantly about matters relating directly to research interests".35 Referring 
directly to "interviews" or "surveys" provoked nervousness and paranoia. Nor 
34 Robert G. Burgess, "Some Role Problems in Field Research", in Robert G. Burgess (ed.), 
Field Research, pp. 45-46. 
35 
Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography: Principles in Practice (London: 
Routledge, 1983), p. 82. 
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was it possible immediately to focus conversations on issues I considered salient. 
Many Uyghurs disliked being asked questions altogether; early on, two 
respondents quoted the saying: "Asking questions of someone is like striking 
him". Uyghurs preferred to volunteer information, and closed up if pushed too 
hard. Aware of the importance of establishing neutral ground with respondents 
where "mundane small-talk" can take place,361 gradually learned to introduce 
natural topics of conversation. I asked a male farmer which crops he grew, or 
how much he had paid for his donkey. I avoided bringing up unnatural topics and 
waited until respondents touched upon relevant subjects. Then I kept the 
conversation focused on that issue, or steered it towards related areas of interest. 
In this way, the unstructured interview "assumes the appearance of a natural 
[and] interesting conversation. But to the proficient interviewer it is always a 
controlled conversation which he guides and bends to the service of his research 
interest".37 Alternatively, I used non-directive questions, where I asked Uyghurs 
for their views on a general issue; this avoided the imposition of my own 
preoccupations and biases. Later, when hypotheses had begun to emerge, I 
checked hunches by using more directive questions.38 
The quality and quantity of information offered greatly depended on the 
environment. As Hammersley and Atkinson note: "Different settings are likely to 
induce and constrain talk of particular kinds".39 While in the mid-nineties some 
respondents would happily speak to me in Uyghur within earsh ot of Han 
immigrants in markets or restaurants, assuming the latter did not understand 
Uyghur, others would not take that risk. Respondents were often afraid to talk in 
the company of other Uyghurs, saying one thing to me in private, then the 
opposite next time we met, when another Uyghur was present. This fear has 
increased following the post-1997 crackdown, with even the young (formerly 
very vocal) exercising caution in interactions with researchers and journalists. 
The fears are well-founded. An American Chinese journalist recently recounted 
the story of Setiwaldi "Dilk?s" Tiliwaldi, a young Uyghur man who was detained 
for talking to her about freedom of speech and providing a list of imprisoned or 
executed persons.40 Another high-profile example is Uyghur businesswoman 
Rabiy? Qadir, sentenced to 8 years imprisonment in 2000 for allegedly "leaking 
state secrets to foreigners" and strategically released in March 2005 ahead of a 
US diplomatic visit to China. She had sent freely available domestic newspaper 
36 
Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography, pp. 81-82. 
37 V. M. Palmer, Field Studies in Sociology: A Student's Manual (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1928), p. 171; cited in Robert G. Burgess, "The Unstructured Interview as a 
Conversation", in Robert G. Burgess (ed.), Field Research, p. 107. 
38 Robert G. Burgess, "The Unstructured Interview as a Conversation", p. 108. 
39 
Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography, p. 125. 
40 Serene Fang, "Interview with Serene Fang: Secret Meetings and an Unexpected Arrest", 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/china401/index.html (accessed 13 January 2005). 
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clippings to her exiled husband in America, and had tried to meet with a US 
congressional delegation in ?r?mchi.41 
In ?r?mchi in 1995-96, I knew many respondents well enough to call on 
them in their homes, while others would visit me in my flat. Elsewhere, it was 
necessary to be more creative. For instance, Uyghur taxi drivers in Q?shq?r 
would chat while ferrying me across town in their motorbike and side-car. It was 
impossible for others to hear our discussion over the noise of the engine and 
while we were in constant motion. In current times of greater political tension, it 
has proved wise to avoid meetings at either respondents' homes or the 
researcher's base, instead talking while conducting ordinary activities in neutral, 
public places. 
Whose Truth? 
People in the field may try to ascertain how far the researcher can be trusted: 
"The fieldworker may find him- or herself being 'tested' and pushed towards 
disclosure, particularly when the group or culture in question is founded upon 
beliefs and commitments ... "42 In Xinjiang in the mid-1990s, the clear dichotomy 
between Han Chinese and Uyghurs on cultural, religious and political grounds 
meant that if one group saw you in the company of the other, it instantly regarded 
you with suspicion. New Uyghur acquaintances often opened a conversation by 
asking "what I thought of the Hans". Since the project investigated Uyghur 
identities and ethnic identity is essentially a subjective issue, I decided not to 
compromise Uyghur trust by associating openly with Han Chinese; it made sense 
to listen mainly to Uyghur accounts. This decision, while leaving me open to 
charges of bias and partisanship, seemed the natural one to take. And as Becker 
famously pointed out, we must always look at the matter from someone's point of 
view.43 By this, he did not advocate that we become partisan; rather, he 
recognized that a single study cannot reflect the infinite layers of positions and 
perspectives within a given power hierarchy,44 that "we can never have a 
'balanced picture' until we have studied all of society simultaneously".45 For 
41 See Dru C. Gladney, "Prisoner's Release Does Not Herald a Xinjiang Spring", YaleGlobal, 
30 March 2005; Radio Free Asia, "Analysis: Rebiya Kadeer's Release Part of China's 
'Hostage Diplomacy' ", 18 March 2005, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/2005/03/18/china 
dissidents/ (accessed 21 March 2005); Amnesty International, "China: Rebiya Kadeer 
Release Welcome, But Tactically Timed", http://news/amnesty.org/mavp/news.nsf/print/ 
ENGASA 170102005 (accessed 17 March 2005). 
42 
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43 
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p. 22. 
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Becker, each "one-sided" study provokes further studies that gradually enlarge 
the sociologist's grasp of all relevant facets of the issue. 
Once I was seen to "take sides" in Xinjiang, a pattern emerged. Urban males 
got two things off their chest at the first meeting: disgust regarding Han Chinese 
habits, and a sense of injustice regarding the perceived Han monopoly on 
resources. Here, my Western identity was an advantage, since most Uyghurs at 
that time believed Westerners to be sympathetic to their situation. Some 
respondents retreated temporarily into silence at the second meeting, having 
reflected on the consequences of others learning their views. Occasionally, the 
withdrawal of trust was permanent. Other respondents tried to manipulate or 
exploit the research situation. Young male intellectuals in the mid-nineties hoped 
to convince me both that Uyghurs should be independent from China and that all 
Uyghurs desired independence, and tailored information they provided to that 
end. They played down instances of political/cultural accommodation and intra 
ethnic disunity, keen to present a picture of a nation of "resisters".46 Their partial 
accounts, while defective in one sense, nonetheless provided evidence of the 
aspirations ofthat particular social group. 
Politics of Gender 
As a woman studying an Islamic society, I encountered field problems not 
experienced by male peers (though they faced different gender-related problems). 
Going out alone sometimes invited adverse reactions, given that Uyghur women 
usually went out with male relatives or other females. At night, this problem 
became acute; I would encounter disapproving looks from male chefs in local 
restaurants. If I attempted to be friendly, some misinterpreted my intention, 
remaining reticent. For others, I became an object of desire. While female 
researchers may often be subject to male hustling in the field, this is especially 
true in an Islamic society, where different norms govern male-female interaction. 
On the first trip, I pretended to be married so as to repel male advances. 
Unfortunately, most Uyghurs could not comprehend why a married woman 
would abandon her husband and go abroad to study. This is a common reaction to 
Western women operating alone in Islamic societies.47 Some viewed me as a 
disloyal wife; others thought me an adulterer, having observed me in the 
company of different men each day. Furthermore, being "married" failed to 
protect me from flirtation. On learning that my "husband" was in England, 
Uyghur men simply declared: "In that case, you can get another boyfriend here!" 
Often, flirtations were little more than humorous interchanges conducted on a 
level at which Uyghurs were used to interacting; sometimes, it was even possible 
to turn the pursuer into the pursued. Once, I jokingly accepted an invitation to go 
46 At first, many participants may try to ensure that the researcher understands the situation 
"correctly"; Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography, p. 108. 
47 Kathleen Jamie was constantly asked "Where is your husband?" by strangers in Pakistan, 
see Among Muslims: Meetings at the Frontiers of Pakistan (London: Sort Of Books, 2002), 
p. 55. 
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dancing with Gh?yr?t, a young kebab trader. Horror crossed his face and he 
produced a thousand excuses why he could not go after all. He had not been 
serious about 
"scoring" and was discouraged with no hard feelings. Over the year, 
we became firm friends; thus the flirtation factor can sometimes be used to 
advantage, for, as Wax notes, "a coquette is in a much better situation to learn 
about men than a nun".48 
The task of developing platonic relationships was challenging. Rural or less 
educated males did not maintain relationships with women other than female 
relatives or co-workers. Others could only conceive of a romantic relationship, as 
described above. Those who did become respondents had to learn to treat me?as 
a Western female academic?completely differently to a Uyghur woman. 
However, each became periodically "jealous" of my relationship with the others, 
while one respondent's family consistently treated me as a prospective daughter 
in-law, with the phrase "just friends" causing hilarity each time it was uttered. 
Keen to avoid being channelled into activities considered suitable for women, 
I re-negotiated my role afresh depending on the gender, educational and religious 
(nominal or observant) background of companions. With rural men and most 
women, I was the epitome of female modesty. With educated men, I played up 
my Western image and academic status. This enabled me to assume a neutral role 
vis-?-vis men, and to observe from the men's side of the room at Uyghur 
weddings, where guests are conventionally segregated. I was thus included in the 
"male fraternity" closed to the society's female members. I gained perhaps 
greater access than a male researcher, who would have had access to male 
domains but only limited access to female domains. However, my "gender 
neutral" relationships with educated, urban men caused ill-feeling among some 
Uyghur women, who saw me as a romantic rival.49 
Politics of Culture 
Ethnography requires concerted efforts in "impression management"?the 
adaptation of appearance, speech and social and cultural behavior?if one is to 
become an 
"acceptable marginal member".50 Following arrival in Xinjiang, 
pressure to conform to Uyghur social and cultural norms was great. Learning to 
speak the native language was of prime importance. Although most educated 
urban Uyghurs speak good Mandarin, many rural Uyghurs know little Chinese. 
Also, communicating in respondents' second language brings difficulties of 
interpretation. There are often no terms in Chinese that exactly correspond to the 
48 Rosalie H. Wax, "Twelve Years Later: An Analysis of Field Experience", in Richard N. 
Adam and Jack J. Preiss (eds), Human Organization Research: Field Relations and 
Techniques (Hornewood: Dorsey Press, 1960), p. 97, cited in Lois Easterday, Diana 
Papademas, Laura Schorr and Catherine Valentine, "The Making of a Female Researcher", 
p. 66. 
49 Cf. Lois Easterday, Diana Papademas, Laura Schorr and Catherine Valentine, "The Making 
of a Female Researcher", p. 64. 
50 
Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography, pp. 78-88. 
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Uyghur, and vice versa. Crucially, speaking to respondents in the second 
language imposed on them by a perceived colonizer creates unhelpful distance. 
The process of learning a Turkic-Altaic language for the first time was 
hindered by two conditions: 1) Chinese is the predominant language spoken in 
Han-dominated ?r?mchi; and 2) Uyghur language textbooks are usually aimed at 
Chinese native speakers, and one must learn the third language through their 
second language. The situation is little improved these days, though many 
Uyghur-English and English-Uyghur dictionaries are available.51 Changes in 
local dialect between oases bring new problems, though close examination of 
local vocabulary often produces synonyms learned in ?r?mchi; at other times, 
the researcher may have to rely on translation by an urban companion. Such 
companions are helpful both in terms of introductions to rural relatives and in 
terms of rephrasing statements in standard Uyghur. 
As a vegetarian, my biggest cultural adjustment concerned diet. Initial polite 
refusals to eat meat in Uyghur homes were not well received. Hosts became 
embarrassed, or assumed that I looked down on them. Moreover, no culture of 
vegetarianism or ideology of animal rights existed even on the margins of that 
society. When I finally began to eat meat in Xinjiang, Uyghur acquaintances 
were glad, and there was a marked improvement in relations. 
I had also to alter my appearance. My (then fashionable) dreadlocks proved 
unsatisfactory for many Uyghur women, who reminded me daily that a woman's 
hair "should be long and silky". After three weeks of resistance, I brushed out the 
dreadlocks and abandoned my nose-ring, which, while recognized as an 
accessory popular in India, was an unhelpful exoticism. Next, my companions 
objected to the bandanna ("handkerchief) I used to tie my hair and insisted that I 
use a barrette. My trousers were deemed "too masculine".52 Initially, I could not 
stomach the spangly, frilly clothes dear to many Uyghur women in the mid 
nineties. I agreed to have winter suits made in woollen materials, but in subtle 
colors and plain styles. Doctor Marten boots were relinquished for a tall, leather 
Central Asian boot, while silver hoop earrings were swapped for yellow-gold 
k?zl?k earrings?with semi-precious gemstones inlaid like "eyes". At that stage, 
adopting the Uyghur look in its entirety would have meant loss of personal ease. 
In south Xinjiang, pressure to conform was far greater. Unlike the urban areas, 
where one may locate oneself within a greater diversity of image, rural women 
hold fast to glamor. In the countryside in the summer of 1996, my image 
metamorphosed. I bought shipong-dokhawa (chiffon embroidered with velvet 
flowers, worn over petticoats) and visited Uyghur sewing shops. I wore 
headscarves and thick nylon tights and felt oddly comfortable doing so. The 
feeling derived partly from the compliments I received once I did dress so. 
51 See also Tarjei Engesaeth, A Textbook of Uyghur Grammar: Volume 1 (private publication, 
2002). 
52 Cf. Kathleen Jamie's description of a meeting with a Pakistani Shia woman: "Her eyes left 
my face, which they had given close examination, and began to travel down my frame. 'You 
do not wear dupatta?' she said, around my shoulders, and at my feet she heaved a sorrowful 
sigh: 'This is not beautiful shoes' ", Among Muslims, p. 36. 
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However, I was to become a laughing stock upon my return to ?r?mchi. Young 
women turned their noses up at the "provincial" styles of the south and, far from 
admiring my absorption of Uyghur tradition, made me the subject of mockery. 
My "Uyghurized" appearance left different impressions. Most Han Chinese 
thought me a Uyghur, and this proved useful for going unnoticed in out-of 
bounds rural areas. I could pass easily as a minkaohan (Chinese-educated 
Uyghur), since they too speak Chinese fluently but their mother tongue 
imperfectly. Uyghurs were divided in their conclusions. Some were convinced 
that I was Uyghur. Others concluded that I must come from a Central Asian 
republic, Russia or Pakistan. Still others knew immediately that I was a 
Westerner. Above all, it was impossible to keep up the pretence when visiting 
Uyghur homes, since at some point I was bound to fail to understand something 
my hosts said, especially if speaking in a local dialect. After one or two vain 
attempts to "pass", I acknowledged the limits to my linguistic and theatrical 
abilities. 
While pressure to conform to the Uyghur dress code persists in rural areas in 
2004 and has heightened among re-Islamizing Uyghurs, it has become easier for 
the Western researcher to merge into the urban environment, where many 
Uyghurs have embraced (modest) Western fashions. During a recent trip, I found 
it advantageous to dress in modern Western clothes and hip-hop styles because 
the focus of my enquiry was now the hybrid identity of the minkaohan youth, 
many of whom like US rapper Eminem. 
Politics of Religion 
The researcher's religious orientation also affects research relations in Xinjiang. I 
quickly discovered that it was imprudent to lack a religious identity. Early on, 
when asked what religion I followed, I said I was not a Christian (naively 
presuming that all Uyghurs would consider Christianity the enemy of Islam), but 
admitted that I "had not been brought up a Muslim". From this, my companions 
concluded that I had no religion and were subsequently less well-disposed toward 
me. Some weeks later, when a professor from deeply religious Q?shq?r inquired 
after my religion, a female Uyghur companion quickly answered: "Since coming 
to Xinjiang, she has believed in Islam". She later explained that this avoided 
creating distance. Thus I encountered another dilemma of personal identity: I 
could not declare myself a Muslim since, while I compromised to a degree (for 
example, diet), strict adherence to the Islamic code would have reduced the 
number of research roles available. Yet I could not say I was a Christian (being 
an agnostic). Eventually, I adopted the standard reply "English people believe in 
Christianity", thus avoiding disclosure of my personal beliefs and the stigma 
attached to being an "unbeliever" while telling an economical truth. Later, I 
would explain that I was extremely interested in Islam and point out the 
connections between the two religions. I did this after observing Uyghur men 
make such comparisons. 
At the other extreme, a strong religious identity may affect a researcher's 
perceptions in the field and subsequent data analysis. For instance, a strong 
Christian identity may render them unresponsive to socio-cultural norms derived 
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from Islamic or popular religious practice, and they may suppress?consciously 
or otherwise?elements that do not accord with their own beliefs. Findings then 
tell a partial or distorted story. This is particularly true where research is 
combined with missionary aims, a not uncommon scenario in Xinjiang. 
In the wake of 11 September 2001 and the "war against terror", I fully 
expected local assumptions of my Christian status to influence field relations 
negatively. Yet while I have had to outline my personal position regarding the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to new respondents and have been aware of anti 
American and anti-British feeling, this has not translated into a backlash against 
Christianity per se, and it remains an option preferable to atheism. 
There is a great need to respect Islamic social norms. In the interest of 
maintaining trust, I ate only foods available in qingzhen (halal) restaurants during 
all field trips. Smoking and drinking were also off limits. Uyghur women are 
generally not permitted to drink alcohol or smoke. This is a social law, upheld by 
community pressure. I therefore rarely smoked or drank alcohol in public, since 
the deliberate expression of my non-Muslim background would have alienated 
respondents, existing and potential. Yet I sometimes accepted a few cigarettes or 
a beer when attending private all-male gatherings of Uyghur intellectuals. These 
educated men were mostly of secular orientation and recognized that I had grown 
up in different cultural surroundings. The concession was enabled in this setting 
by an emphasis on my Western origin. Uyghur women were generally more 
disapproving. Undoubtedly, my decision to quit smoking prior to my 2004 trip 
made life easier, especially given the new climate of Islamic renewal, with many 
Uyghurs embracing orthodox practice. 
Politics of Personal Values 
It would be dishonest to pretend that, after hearing countless Uyghur accounts of 
injustices suffered at the hands of Han Chinese, I did not develop political 
sympathies. I was at constant risk of over-identifying with respondents and of 
ceasing to problematize their perspectives. As Becker explains: "... we fall into 
deep sympathy with the people we are studying ... because of this, we do not 
give a balanced picture".53 In Xinjiang, my personal beliefs concerning stateless 
nations made the prospect of "siding" with the Uyghurs a real threat. During the 
initial months, I was sometimes guilty of asking "loaded questions" designed to 
encourage particular responses.54 It took a few unanticipated responses to remind 
me that Uyghur views and values would not necessarily mirror my own, nor 
those of other Uyghurs. 
I attempted to reduce the problem of bias by making those personal values 
explicit during data collection and analysis. As Becker notes: "Whatever side we 
are on, we must use our techniques impartially enough that a belief to which we 
are especially sympathetic could be proved untrue".55 When collecting data, I had 
53 Howard S. Becker, "Whose Side Are We On?", p. 16. 
54 Howard S. Becker, "Whose Side Are We On?", p. 23. 
55 Howard S. Becker, "Whose Side Are We On?", p. 24. 
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to beware of recording it selectively, and of talking only with people I found 
politically sympathetic.561 initially spent too much time with one young male 
intellectual, partly because he said all the right things (remarks which supported 
my hypothesis on the existence of a widespread ethno-political identity). To 
counter this tendency, I resolved to spend time with a range of individuals from 
different social groups (older Uyghurs; women; minkaohan), some of whom 
might deliver "hostile information" incongruent with my personal hopes.57 At 
data analysis stage, it was important not to present data selectively. Second, each 
account had to be explained within the context in which it was produced, since 
another respondent (or group of respondents) might provide a different account 
of the same circumstance or event.58 Third, it was important to adopt an outside 
standpoint on respondents' standpoints, for as Gouldner notes: "Isn't it the 
sociologists' job to look at human situations in ways enabling them to see things 
that are not ordinarily seen by the participants in them?"59 This constant battle to 
maintain the dual role of insider and outsider maximized the opportunities to 
participate and reflect. 
Conclusion 
Conventional research methods are difficult to apply in Xinjiang, especially 
where investigating politically sensitive issues. An intuitive approach must be 
taken towards data collection, whereby methods and roles are adopted, rejected, 
modified and re-negotiated in response to each situation and the changing 
political environment. Most importantly, the researcher must learn from mistakes. 
My pretence of being married, employed as a strategy to fend off "hustlers", had 
proved disastrous in 1995-96. When I met respondents again in 2002, I had to 
tell them I was divorced?an easily understandable scenario given the unnatural 
distance I had previously put between my "husband" and myself. In the current 
political climate, the greatest problem in Xinjiang is respondents' fear of political 
repercussions. Whereas a Western identity once proved useful, in the era of the 
"war on terror" many Uyghurs doubt that any benefit will accrue from talking to 
a foreigner and fear the consequences of doing so. Perhaps the greatest challenge 
is gaining respondents' trust while taking all necessary measures to protect them. 
56 Cf. Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography, p. 84. 
57 Alvin W. Gouldner, For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today (London: 
Allen Lane, 1973), p. 59. 
58 Cf. Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography, p. 112. 
59 Alvin W. Gouldner, For Sociology, p. 57; cf. Robert G. Burgess, "Some Role Problems in 
Field Research", p. 48. 
